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ABSTRACT
Recognition memory for complex pictures was
investigated using 3 variables: meaningfulness of the
target (anomalous or conventional), type of transformation
in the distractor (substitution or rearrangement), and
extent of transformation (whether the target and
distractor were consistent or inconsistent in
meaningf ulness)
. Three- and four- year olds were
familiarized with 16 different thematic scenes with which
a child this age would likely have had experience. Half
of the target pictures shown to a child were conventional,
and half were anomalous, containing either an object or
arrangement of objects that did not fit the theme. During
the recognition test, targets were paired with distractors
that were either conventional or anomalous (yielding the
consistent-inconsistent conditions) and contained either a
substitution of one object or a rearrangement of objects.
Overall, recognition memory was similar for conventional
and anomalous targets indicating that both types of
pictures were assimilated into schemata equally well.
When target and distractor were inconsistent in
meaningfulness, recognition memory was facilitated. Thus,
information about whether the target contained an anomaly
or not was remembered. Memory for inventory was far
better than for arrangement information, probably because
children were able to proficiently tag specific details
about anomalous inventory. For the young child, knowledge
about what items are appropriate to familiar themes is a
more integral part of schemata than knowledge about
appropriate spatial relationships between those items.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Recognition memory for complex pictures shows marked
improvement throughout childhood (Mandler and Robinson,
1978); Kirasic, Siegel, and Allen, 1980). One factor that
has been hypothesized to account for this developmental
change is an increase in planful approaches to memory
including a better understanding of how mnemonics and
relationships between items can facilitate retrieval
(Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell, 1975; Brown, 1975).
Before the age of 5 years, however, children generally
fail to engage in planful memory (Brown, 1975) and thus,
developmental differences in the performance of
preschoolers' is more likely due to improvements in other
factors. For example, Vlietstra (1978) concluded that the
memory of preschoolers is limited by ineffective
attention; preschoolers are easily distracted by salient,
but irrelevant, cues in pictures so that subsequent
recognition of those pictures is poor.
One factor that may underlie improvement in memory
during the preschool years is an increase in semantic
knowledge (Myers and Perlmutter, 1978; Kail, 1979).
Semantic knowledge refers to general, real world
knowledge; facts that are independent of a particular
instance. For example, knowing that the sun belongs in
1
2the sky f that a stove belongs in the kitchen, and that a
pig does not, is semantic knowledge that the young child
can acquire. Sophian and Hagen (1978) found that 4 and 5
year olds were likely to use semantic categorical
information to aid retrieval of pictures of items. But
these children did not make strategic use of relevent
semantic information to categorically organize recall of
these pictorial stimuli. Perlmutter and Myers (1979) also
found no evidence of strategy use in 2 - 4 year olds but
by the age of 4 the children tended to recall items
clustered by category. Thus, although young children's
memory is nondeliberate, it is categorically organized.
If improvement in young children's memory is largely
a result of knowledge growth, then an important variable
to take into consideration in memory research is the
knowledge the child possesses. This knowledge constitutes
the child's knowledge base and most theorists view this
base to be organized in systematic ways depending on the
child's level of cognitive development (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1973). When material can be assimilated or
integrated into an existing knowledge base, then it is
said to be meaningful for the child and because it is part
of the memory base, it is also assumed to be more
memorable (Flavell and Wellman, 1977; Brown, 1975). When
information is not meaningful, that is, cannot be
integrated into a child's knowledge base, memory for that
information is hypothesized to be poor (Mandler and
Robinson, 1978). Thus, the primary factor in memory
performance for the young child could be involuntary
memory processes by which meaningful information is best
remembered.
Literature Review
The present study is an investigation of the young
child's recognition memory for complex pictures. The
literature review is organized around the premise that
semantic knowledge is a major factor in early memory. The
review is divided into 5 sections: 1) a brief
presentation of constructivist and schematic views of
memory; 2) an examination of the research literature
concerned with whether preschoolers engage in constructive
activities in encoding and storing information; 3) an
outline of opposing viewpoints on what processes are
involved in children's recognition memory for complex
pictures; 4) a discussion of the relationship between
schematic knowledge and memory for complex pictures; and
5) an examination of schemata as frameworks for encoding
and retrieving information about complex pictures.
Assumptions of constructivist and schematic views QL
memory. Schemata and the constructivist approach to memory
4are inseparable: both stress the role of knowledge and
cognitive abilities (Flavell, 1977). Schemata are generic
knowledge structures consisting of representations of
events or stimuli. Recognition of a stimulus occurs when
incoming information is integrated within a schema. For
incoming information to be meaningful, it must be
integrated into the schema. This integrative process is
the critical element within the constructivist view of
memory since during integration into a schema, information
is interpreted and modified. For example, parts of the
information may be omitted, other parts highlighted and
even elaborated and inferred. What is encoded is
contingent upon whatever schema serves as organizer of
this information (Paris and Lindauer, 1976; Flavell,
1977) . What is omitted or inferred about a stimulus is
dependent upon the previously acquired bits of knowledge
that form the schema (Piaget and Inhelder, 1973).
Constructive abilities qL £M preschooler, , The
constructive nature of memory is demonstrated when adults
recall information that is only implied. Adults
supplement and distort the original event by integrating
it with knowledge represented by the schema (eg.,
Bransford and Franks, 1971). The usefulness of a
schematic model of memory is apparent in much of the
5literature on adult memory. For example, Shank and
Abelson (1979) proposed that semantic features and the
role of context are important in the interpretation of
text. Both involve schematic knowledge that the reader
brings to the task.
Even infants are assumed to engage in limited forms
of constructive activities. For instance, it has been
widely observed that, for the infant, presentation of a
stimulus discrepant from a previously established schema
results in prolonged attention (eg., Fantz, 1964). This
prolonged attention is hypothesized to be the result of
attempts by the infant to integrate novel stimuli into
existing schemata (Kagan, 1971)
.
Research with preschool children indicates that they
too engage in constructive activities, omitting and
inferring information from their perceptions. As children
grow, they increasingly make more complex inferences
(Paris and Lindauer, 1976; Schmidt, Paris and Stober,
1979) . For example, Perlmutter and Myers (1976) showed
preschoolers colored and black and white pictures of
familiar objects. During the subsequent recognition test,
children often "recognized" as previously seen a colored
picture of a color-specific item when what was actually
presented was a black and white picture of that item. On
the other hand, when shown a black and white picture of a
6color non-specific item, children were less likely to make
an inference about color and more likely to correctly
choose the black and white picture as familiar. Children
seeing a black and white picture of a color specific item
such as a banana, apparently encoded "banana", and matched
it with the schema they possessed for such an object. As
a consequence, inferences about the original information
were made. Their choice of colored pictures indicated
that they were elaborating the presented information
according to established knowledge or schemata for those
objects. These constructive activities are probably
involuntary processes; the child integrates information
into existing schemata, modifying both perceptions and
schemata. In this non-deliberate way, the child maintains
consistency between the real world and internal
representations and builds more and more complex and
differentiated schemata (Kagan, 1971)
.
Constructive abi l ities and recognition memory Iqjl
complex pictures
.
Some researchers have suggested that
young children do not engage in constructive activity when
attending to complex pictures. Reese (1970) reported that
a child's memory of visual information was reduced to a
figurative image stripped of idiosyncratic details and
relationships between items. Similarly, Siegel and White
(1975) proposed that young children's encoding of
environmental events is landmark based: that they attend
to single salient objects exclusively, ignoring the
relationship between objects or their context. Elkind
(1969) noted that pictures elicited no overall meaning or
schematic label for young children, who merely enumerate
the elements.
The findings of recent research have seriously
challenged these assertions. First, it appears that
Reese's (1970) proposition that very young children's
visual memory lacks detail is inaccurate. Preschool
children can recognize changes in detail. In particular,
young children recognize changes in inventory (individual
items occupying the scene) and spatial relationships
among objects (Brown and Campione, 1972) . Secondly,
Siegel and White's (1975) proposition that very young
children ignore context is inaccurate. Kirasic, Siegel,
and Allen (1980) found that although 5 year olds required
more time than older children to recognize whole scenes
than pictures of isolated items, recognition memory in
these young children was greater for items in context than
items taken out of context. Using looking behavior as the
dependent measure, Davis, Greco, and Daehler (1982) also
found that 2 year olds attended to contextual
relationships in complex pictures. Thus it is apparent
8that very young children attend to relationships between
objects and context in complex pictures, and do not
process objects only in isolation. Contrary to Elkind's
(1969) conclusions, meaningful complex pictures are
encoded as a whole and the scene's conceptual meaning is
interpreted and stored.
Schemata; Meaningfulness and memory. Schematic
knowledge is hypothesized to be an important factor in
complex picture comprehension and recognition (Kirasic,
Siegel and Allen, 1980). However, unlike adults, young
children may not be able to effectively integrate
information into a schema if the information does not
correspond very closely to the schema (Mandler and
Robinson, 1978) . The results of a few studies can be
interpreted within this perspective. For example, Kirasic,
Siegel and Allen (1980) concluded that compared to older
children, the slower and less accurate recognition of
complex pictures by younger children was due to less
efficient encoding and retrieval of information from
complex pictures. But the stimuli in their study were
photographs of distinctive environmental landmarks such as
bridges, buildings, and fountains, scenes for which young
children probably have a limited knowledge base. Their
poor recognition performance might have been due to less
•9
well developed schemata for bridges, etc.. Similarly,
Reese's (1970) observation that children fail to attend to
the interaction between items was likely due to the
meaninglessness of the interaction presented to the child.
Not many preschoolers have a schema for a fish on the
phone or a rooster carrying a flag (from Reese and
Lipsitt, 1970)
.
When children are shown pictures of more familiar
scenes, scenes for which they are likely to have a schema,
their memory performance improves. Mandler and Robinson
(1978) observed that when children 6 to 10 years of age
were shown organized pictures, their recognition accuracy
was similar to adult performance. However, when shown
unorganized pictures, children's recognition accuracy
declined significantly in comparison to recognition
accuracy for organized pictures. In contrast, for adults,
recognition of both organized and unorganized pictures was
similar. Mandler and Robinson speculated that the
children's performance on organized pictures was aided by
their schema for those scenes. Adults were additionally
able to impose meaning on unorganized arrays of objects,
and their recognition memory for these scenes was
facilitated. The data of Davis, Greco, and Daehler (1982)
also indicate . better memory for meaningful pictures: the
patterns of looking behavior of 2 year olds indicated that
10
they were able to detect changes more readily in pictures
for which they were assumed to have more well-established
schemata
.
The implication of these results is that memory for a
complex picture is facilitated if the picture is
meaningful, that is, fits into an already existing schema
for the child. As children grow older, their semantic
knowledge base becomes broader and schemata become more
numerous. As a result, there is an increase in the
probability that a picture will be meaningful, i.e., a
schema to which the pictures can be assimilated exists. In
this way, a schema-based model explains developmental
improvements observed in complex picture recognition
memory in preschool children.
Schemata as frameworks for encoding and retrieval o£
complex pictures from memory. If schemata act as
frameworks for both encoding and retrieving information in
complex pictures (Brewer and Treyens, 1981) , then
recognition for detail will depend on how the specific
information is integrated with the schema-based knowledge.
Thematically expected objects and expected relationships
between objects in a picture can be readily encoded into a
schema. As a result, objects which are particularly
salient attributes of a schema (high-schema objects) are
11
more likely than low-schema objects to be recalled or
recognized (Brewer and Treyens, 1981). However, adults
are also likely to falsely recognize expected objects
which are appropriate to the context of a picture but
which were not previously presented (Brewer and Treyens,
1981; Friedman, 1979). In other words, adults have
difficulty discriminating between two pictures of the same
scene in which one appropriate object has been substituted
for another. Shank and Abelson (1979) initially described
an analogous process for sentences having the same
meaning and concluded that both sentences have one
representation in memory. Friedman (1979) extended this
notion to pictures: any two pictures which have the same
meaning are assimilated into the same schema in memory.
Thus, detailed information about two different events
which are assimilated into the same schema will be
confused in recall.
A schema-based model also has implications for the
recall of details that do not conform to an established
schema. For example, during encoding, ambiguous
information will be assimilated into existing schemata so
that adults will distort recall according to the schema
to which the information had been assimilated (Bransford
and Franks, 1971) . On the other hand, when an unexpected
event occurs, attention becomes focused. Friedman (1979)
12
found that adults visually fixate on unexpected objects
longer than on expected objects in pictures depicting real
world scenes. According to Friedman, presentation of the
scenes evoked a frame, or schema, but in order to identify
unexpected objects, more analysis of their visual detail
was required. Perhaps items unrelated to or inconsistent
with a schema were also "tagged" as separate units
(Graesser, Gordon, and Sawyer, 1979). As a consequence,
discrimination memory was less accurate for typical items
in a schema but more accurate for "tagged" atypical items
(Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Friedman, 1979).
Friedman (1979) also found that adults more readily
noticed deletions or replacements made to unexpected
objects than to expected objects. She hypothesized that
this difference between detection of schema-appropriate
and schema-inappropriate changes in pictures was a result
of differences in the assimilation of 2 pictures of the
same scene. When the 2 pictures differed by an expected
object, the 2 were readily confused. Whereas a picture of
the same scene with an unexpected object may also be
assimilated into that schema, it is done so with a "tag",
thereby increasing the salience of a change involving that
item.
Do schemata act as frameworks for encoding and
13
retrieval of information about complex pictures for
children in the same way as for adults? Ratner and Myers
(1981) found that 2-4 year olds could both identify
appropriate items found in the kitchen and bathroom as
well as reject inappropriate items. in addition there was
an increase with age in the accuracy of identification and
number of items produced. But even 2 year olds produced a
greater proportion of core items which were defining
features of those rooms than inappropriate items. These
results indicate that for preschoolers a scene schema
exists and this schema contains information about
appropriate and inappropriate items in a scene. However,
most of the research on children's schematic
representations of familiar scenes has been done with
older children. For example, Goodman (1980) found that
elementary school children were less likely to recognize
highly typical than atypical items in pictures of
familiarized scenes. These results replicate in children
the results Freidman (1979) and Brewer and Treyens (1981)
found with adults.
Statement cJL the problem
The present study was an investigation of the
preschooler's memory for complex pictures. Three
variables hypothesized to influence recognition memory for
complex pictures were investigated. These three variables
14
were 1) the meaningf ulness of the target pictures:
conventional versus containing an anomalous item or
arrangement of items; 2) type of transformation
exhibited in the distractor during a forced-choice
recognition test: substitution versus rearrangement of
items; and 3) the extent of the transformation between a
paired target and distractor,
.
that is, whether target and
distractor were consistent (both conventional or both
anomalous) or inconsistent (one conventional, the other
anomalous)
.
The first variable was concerned with the
meaningfulness of the familiarized target pictures and
its influence on memory. The review of the relevant
literature provided considerable evidence that recognition
memory for unorganized complex pictures is relatively poor
for young children. Yet the research on this issue is
limited. For example, very little is known about what
happens to memory if a picture which is otherwise
meaningful, contains an unusual object or rearrangement of
items so that they occupy unusual places in the scene.
In this study, subjects were shown pictures of common
scenes during familiarization trials (eg., bathroom,
park) . Half of the scenes were conventional in the sense
that the specific objects included and their locations
15
within the scene were typical. But half of the scenes
contained an anomaly. These anomalous scenes included
either 1) an object which was not appropriate or 2)
one or two objects which occupied unconventional or
inappropriate locations. These anomalies did not
drastically alter the organization of the picture but were
designed to interfere with the schematic
representativeness or theme of the drawing: eg. f in the
park scene, replacing flowers with a telephone
(substitution) or switching the flowers with the sun
(rearrangement)
.
If an anomaly disrupted the meaning of a
picture to the extent that a young child could not
assimilate it into a schema, recognition memory for these
targets would be expected to be poor relative to memory
for conventional targets. But Friedman (1979) proposes
that an anomaly should not change the general
representativeness of a scene; the anomaly is tagged or
"stuck on" to the schema to which the picture is being
assimilated. Since the changes introduced in the
anomalous targets might not be of sufficient magnitude to
disrupt encoding of the stimuli into schemata, it could
also be hypothesized that recognition memory would be
comparable for conventional and anomalous pictures. Young
children might be able to assimilate both types of
pictures into existing schemata, dealing with the
16
anomalies in such a way that they would not totally
disrupt the meaning of the pictures.
The second variable of interest in this study was
whether preschoolers showed comparable memory for both the
inventory and the spatial arrangement of items in a scene.
During the forced-choice recognition test, each
familiarized target was paired with a distractor depicting
that same scene but in which there was either a
substitution or rearrangement of items. Two year olds do
notice substitutions made in familiar room scenes (Davis,
Greco, and Daehler, 1982) and three year olds can
reconstruct spatial relationships among items of furniture
in dollhouse rooms (Myers, Perlmutter, and Cohen,
unpublished manuscript) . Older children remember
inventory and spatial information when it is schematically
organized (Mandler and Robinson, 1978) . Based on these
results, preschoolers in the present study were expected
to be sensitive to both spatial and inventory details.
Mandler and her collegues found that recognition memory
for organized pictures was similar for both substitution
and rearrangement transformations. Thus it was
hypothesized that recognition memory for inventory and
arrangement of objects would be similar.
The third variable involved recognition of targets
17
when paired distractors were consistent in meaningf ulness
or inconsistent in meaningf ulness. According to Friedman
(1979)
,
if two different conventional pictures of a scene
are assimilated into the same schema, discrimination
between conventional target and conventional distractor is
made more difficult than discrimination between
conventional target and anomalous distractor. Mandler and
Stein (1974) found that recognition accuracy in children
varied with the extent of the transformation in the
distractor. If a distractor was inconsistent with the
conceptual meaning of the target picture, subjects were
more likely to correctly identify the target picture, than
if a distractor and target were consistent in meaning.
Paris and Mahoney (1974) found that 7-11 year olds had
difficulty discriminating between target and distractor
pictures which depicted consistent semantic relationships
between items, but they readily discriminated targets from
distractors which violated explicit or inferred
relationships. On the basis of these findings, it was
hypothesized that recognition memory would be greater for
conventional targets paired with anomalous distractors
than for conventional targets paired with conventional
distractors.
If children are more likely to remember a
conventional traget in an inconsistent than consistent
18
pair, then similarly, will children be more likely to
remember an anomalous target in an inconsistent than
consistent pair? Assuming that the children would be able
to integrate anomalous targets into schemata, but retain
some information about the presence of an anomaly, it was
hypothesized that recognition memory for anomalous targets
would be less accurate when paired with anomalous
distractors than when paired with conventional
distractors.
Friedman (1979) found that adults more readily
noticed substitutions involving unexpected objects than
expected objects in complex pictures. In the anomalous
pictures of the present study, the unexpected object in
the target is substituted for by another anomalous object
in the distractor. And in conventional target
conventional distractor pairs, only expected objects are
involved in changes. Thus, it is hypothesized that
recognition memory would be better for anomalous targets
paired with anomalous substitution distractors (anomalous
consistent pair) than for conventional targets paired with
conventional substitution distractors (conventional
consistent pair)
.
Friedman (1979) also found that recognition memory
was more accurate for changes in spatial location of
19
unexpected than expected objects. But the present study
does not duplicate Friedman's rearrangement
transformation. In the present study, all rearrangements
involved expected objects; it was the arrangement of
objects that was either expected or unexpected. if
unexpected arrangements are tagged in a manner similar to
the way the presence or location of an unexpected object
might be tagged, changes involving unexpected arrangements
may be more salient than changes involving expected
arrangements of objects. So, it was also hypothesized
that recognition memory would be better for anomalous
consistent pairs involving rearrangement transformation
than for conventional consistent pairs involving
rearrangement
.
In summary, memory for anomalous versus conventional
pictures was investigated and it was hypothesized that 1)
children would be able to detect substitution and
rearrangement transformations in the distractor equally
well; 2) recognition memory would be better for
familiarized pictures in inconsistent pairs than
consistent pairs; and 3) recognition memory would be
better for anomalous consistent pairs than conventional
consistent pairs for both substitution and rearrangement
transformations.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 64 3 and 4 year olds attending day
care centers and nursery schools in a large university
community; half of the children were male, half were
female. Subjects ranged in age from 2 years, 11 months to
5 years, 0 months. The median age was 4 years 2 months (SD
6.5 months). A total of 71 children were tested, 7 of
whom were dropped from the study: one (a 3 year old boy)
for leaving the task, two (3 year old girls) for failing
the training trials, and four (two 3 year old girls, one 4
year old girl, and one 4 year old boy) for making 8 or
more errors on the recognition test.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 112 xeroxed, 5x7 inch black and white
pictures of 16 different scenes. The 16 scenes were
chosen because they were common in the every day life of a
young child (see Table 1) . Pictures were held inside
acetate pages and each child's set of pictures was
inserted into a three-ring notebook prior to the session.
Seven different pictures were created for each of the
16 scenes. Three of these served as target pictures
during familiarization trials, and four as distractors
paired with targets during recognition testing. Each
20
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picture consisted of line drawings of 4 discrete objects
or units (eg., a couple of snowflakes is one unit) plus
background (eg., water, walls, ground).
The 3 target pictures included one conventional
picture, portraying a typical representation of the scene,
and 2 anomalous pictures. The 4 items present in each
conventional scene are listed in columns 1 through 4 of
Table 1. The anomalous targets for each scene were
identical to the conventional target except that in the
case of anomalous inventory, a standard item in the
conventional scene was replaced by an item unusual for
that scene. The conventional item which was replaced to
yield the anomalous inventory picture is indicated in the
fourth column of Table 1; the anomalous item introduced is
indicated in column 5. For example, in the park scene, the
anomalous inventory target was constructed by replacing
the flowers with a clock. The anomalous arrangement
target was produced by rotating items so that one or two
of them occupied inappropriate positions in the picture.
For example, in the park scene, the sun, flowers, and
bench were rotated so that the sun was on the ground and
the bench was in the sky. The three items rotated to
yield the anomalous arrangement target picture are
indicated in columns 2, 3, and 4.
The 4 distractors for each scene- included 2 involving
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substitution of items and 2 involving rearrangement of
items. For one of the 2 substitution abstractors, the
conventional scene was maintained by replacing an item in
the target with a different basic level category item that
was appropriate for the theme of that picture. In the
other, an anomalous substitution occurred; the item that
was inserted in the picture was inappropriate to the
theme. The conventional and anomalous substitution items
are listed in columns 6 and 7, respectively, in Table 1
and always replaced the item in column 4. Substitution
items were similar in size, shape and detail to the item
they replaced.
The remaining 2 distractor pictures consisted of
rearrangement transformations; one rearrangement again
yielded a conventional picture for a scene, the other
resulted in an anomalous picture. To create the
rearrangement transformation, the positions of 2 of 3
items in each of the target scenes were switched. The 3
items in a scene that were involved in rearrangement
transformations were the same 3 that were rotated to
create the anomalous arrangement target (columns 2, 3, and
4 in Table 1) . The pictures were constructed so that
either the conventional or anomalous substitution
distractor could be paired with the conventional or
anomalous inventory target for the recognition test;
likewise, either the conventional or anomalous
rearrangement distractor could be paired with the
conventional or anomalous arrangement target.
Design
The effects of three different variables on
recognition memory were of interest: 1) meaningfulness of
the target picture: conventional versus anomalous; 2)
type of transformation exhibited in the distractor:
substitution or rearrangement; and 3) extent of the
transformation between a target and its distractor:
consistent or inconsistent. All three variables were
within-subjects variables.
Meaningfulness of the target. During
familiarization, each child was shown one target picture
from each of the 16 scenes. For 8 of the scenes, the
conventional target was shown. Four anomalous inventory
targets and 4 anomalous arrangement targets comprised the
remaining 8 scenes. For every 4 subjects, 2 saw the
conventional target of a particular scene, 1 saw the
anomalous inventory target, and 1 saw the anomalous
arrangement target for a scene.
Type of transformation. During the forced-choice
recognition test, each target picture was paired with 1
distractor picture of the same scene. For the 8
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conventional target pictures shown to a child, 4 were
paired with substitution distractors and 4 were paired
with rearrangement distractors. of the 8 anomalous
targets shown to a child, the 4 anomalous inventory
targets were paired with substitution distractors (2
conventional, 2 anomalous) and the 4 anomalous arrangement
targets were paired with rearrangement distractors (2
conventional, 2 anomalous). Thus each child received a
total of 8 rearrangement transformations and 8
substitution transformations.
Extent of. transformation. For half of the scenes
target and distractor were consistent (both were
conventional or both were anomalous) and for the other
half of the scenes, target and distractor were
inconsistent (one conventional, one anomalous). Of the 8
conventional target pictures shown to a child, 2 each were
paired with conventional substitution, conventional
rearrangement, anomalous substitution, and anomalous
rearrangement distractors. For the 4 anomalous inventory
targets, 2 were paired with conventional and 2 with
anomalous substitution distractors. For the 4 anomalous
arrangement targets, 2 were paired with conventional and 2
with anomalous rearrangement distractors.
A summary of the 8 kinds of target-distractor pairs
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is shown in Table 2; each of these 8 kinds of pairings
occurred twice over the 16 trials for every child. Each
target of every scene was paired with each of its
distractors an equal number of times across subjects.
Order of presentation of the 16 target-distractor
pairs was random for each child with 4 restrictions: 1)
each of the 8 kinds of target-distractor pair was
represented once in both the first and second block of 8
trials; 2) conventional targets or anomalous targets could
not be presented more than 3 times in succession; 3)
distractors containing a substitution change or
distractors containing rearrangements could not appear
more than 3 times in succession; and 4) consistent or
inconsistent target-distractor pairs could not be
presented more than 3 times in succession. Presentation
of the target on the right or left of the distractor
occurred equally often over the 16 trials and also varied
randomly with the restriction that the target's relative
position not be the same more than 3 times in a row.
The dependent measure was the frequency of errors on
each of the 8 kinds of target-distractor pairs. Errors
were classified into 3 types: 1) "wrong" errors were
those where the child simply chose the distractor as the
picture that was seen before; 2) "same" errors were those
where the child declared that the target and distractor
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pictures were the same and thus decided that both had been
seen before; and 3) "unsure" errors were those where the
child noticed that the target and distractor were not the
same but would not or could not choose either one as
having been seen before.
Procedure
The child was seated in a child-sized chair at a
small table with the Experimenter. First, 8 training
trials were administered, 4 to acquaint the child with the
Experimenter and 4 to familiarize him or her with the
experimental task. On the first four trials the
Experimenter showed the child 4 pictures of single objects
and asked "What is this a picture of?". Each child was
instructed to turn the page when he or she wanted to look
at the next picture. After completing these four trials,
the child was told that he or she would see 2 pictures,
one that had just been seen and one that was not shown;
the child was instructed to choose the one he or she saw
before. All children could correctly identify all 4
pictures; 4 more training trials followed. On these
trials, a picture of a child interacting with an object
was shown. The child was instructed to look at each
picture carefully and turn the page when ready to see the
next one. After looking at the 4 familiarization pictures
30
the Experimenter announced "Now I am going to show you 2
pictures, one is a picture you just saw and the other one
is a little bit different. I want you to tell me which
one you saw before.". The Experimenter turned the pages
to present the pairs of pictures and asked "Which picture
did you see before?" After the child made a choice the
Experimenter asked "How do you know you saw this picture
before; what is different about this other picture?".
This question was asked in order to train the children to
look for small changes in detail. Any errors were
corrected and the child's response to the "what's
different" question was provided if necessary. For
example, if the child pointed to a similarity between the
two pictures, the similarity was noted by the
Experimenter: "But this picture has a also.". If the
child could not recognize or point out the difference
between target and distractor for at least 3 of the pairs,
he or she was not tested further.
After training, the child was familiarized with each of s
the 16 scenes. Instructions to the child were "Now I have
16 pictures, that's this many (showing the thickness of
pages) , and I want you to look at each one carefully and
try to remember them so we can play this game some more.
Turn the pages when you are ready.". The Experimenter
reminded the child to look at the pictures carefully if he
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or she began turning the pages rapidly.
After familiarization, the child was tested for
recognition of the target pictures. Instructions to the
child were "Now I'm going to show you 2 pictures at a
time. One is exactly the same as a picture you just saw,
and one is a little bit different. I want you to tell me
which one you've seen before.". As the Experimenter
turned the page for each trial, the child was asked "Now
which one of these did you see before?". After the child
chose one picture, the Experimenter asked, "How do you
know you saw that one?". If the child declared that the 2
pictures were the same, the Experiemtner asked, "Are you
sure? Look at them carefully.". If the child insisted
that they were the same, a "same" error was recorded. If
the child declined to pick one, the Experimenter asked,
"Do you think they are the same?". If the child replied
"Yes", the Experimenter asked, "Are you sure? Look at
them carefully.". If the child insisted, again, a same
error was recorded. If the child replied, "No", the
Experimenter asked, "Which one do you think you saw?".
If. the child still declined to answer, an "unsure" error
was recorded.
Sessions with the children were tape recorded and during
the recognition test each child's choice of left or right
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picture was recorded. Audio tapes were transcribed and
coded for the child's answers to the question "How do you
know you saw that one?". These answers illustrated
whether the child could pick out the discrepancy between
target and distractor and base the judgement of
familiarity on that information, rather than relying on
guesswork.
The number of errors for each child on each type of
target- distractor pair were calculated and the data were
analyzed by a 2 (age: older versus younger than the median
age) x 2 (block) x 2 (target: conventional versus
anomalous) x 2 (transformation: rearrangement versus
substitution) x 2 (extent of transformation between target
and distractor: consistent versus inconsistent) repeated
measures analysis of variance. The age comparison
provided a grouping variable in the design. Individual
cell mean comparisons were made using Bonferroni t-tests.
Additional ANOVA's were carried out to test specific
hypotheses about errors on rearrangement and substitution
transformations. Furthermore, the relationship between
type of error and type of target-distractor pair was
tested with a Cochran Q test.
CHAPTER in
RESULTS
The mean error rate for all children was 22.3%. This
error rate was significatly less than chance (t = 2.43; p
< .05), indicating that the children were able to
recognize many of the complex pictures they had seen
before. Predictably the younger children made more errors
than the older children, 25.8% and 18.8%, respectively.
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of age
(F(l,62) = 6 .63; p = .0147; see Appendix A). There were
no interactions involving age, indicating that the
improvement in recognition memory for older children was
similar across the 2 kinds of target, 2 kinds of
transformation, and extent of transformation.
Recognition memory for conventional and anomalous
targets was quite similar. Mean error rates were 21.9%
and 22.7%, respectively, a difference which was not
significant. Young children were able to recognize both
types of pictures equally well. These results suggest that
the changes introduced in the anomalous targets did not
disrupt the theme and children were able to assimilate
anomalous as well as conventional pictures into existing
schemata. Spontaneous verbalizations of the children
during familiarization trials also indicated that the
theme of the anomalous targets was still apparent.
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Sometimes the children incorporated the anomaly into the
theme, for example, "The lady is with her rabbit at the
grocery."; "The worm (snake) is unhappy in the water.".
Sometimes the children acknowledged the anomaly, for
example, "How does he drive the boat underwater?"; "A
clock outside - that's silly.". And sometimes the children
ignored the anomaly, for example, "The grandma is reading
the boy a story.", (ignoring the panda on the wall); "Sun,
bench, flowers, tree.", (ignoring the sun on the ground,
bench in the sky)
.
The type of transformation exhibited in the
distractor, substitution versus rearrangement of items,
influenced performance markedly. Children made less than
half the number of recognition errors on targets paired
with a substitution distractor (14.1%) than they did on
those paired with a rearrangement distractor (30.5%). The
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for
transformation (F(l,62)= 38.95; p < .001). Furthermore,
children recognized targets paired with substitution
distractors more easily than targets paired with
rearrangement distractors regardless of whether the
targets were conventional or anomalous. Mean error rates
for conventional targets paired with substitution and
rearrangement distractors were 13.7% and 30.1%,
respectively, whereas mean error rates for anomalous
targets paired with substitution and rearrangement
distractors were 14.4% and 30.9%, respectively. The ANOVA
yielded a nonsignificant interaction of target with
transformation.
The extent of the transformation, whether target and
distractor were consistent or inconsistent in
meaningfulness to the theme, affected recognition memory.
Overall, recognition memory was better for targets in
inconsistent pairs than consistent pairs. Mean error
rates were 17.0% and 27.6%, respectively, a difference
which was significant (F(l,62) = 21.18; p < .001). The
overall ANOVA, however, revealed 2 significant 2-way
interactions involving the extent of transformation: 1)
target with extent of transformation (F(l,62) = 6.06;
p = .05) and 2) type of transformation with extent of
transformation (F(l,62) = 10.16; p = .0022). There was no
significant 3-way interaction between target (conventional
or anomalous)
,
type of transformation (substitution or
rearrangement) , and extent of transformation (consistent
or inconsistent). However, the pattern of error rates
involving target and extent of transformation appeared to
differ markedly between rearrangement and substitution
transformations. These 2-way interactions can be better
understood by examining the results of two subsequent
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ANOVA's in which the data involving rearrangement and
substitution test pairs were analyzed separately.
Rearrangement transfnrm^i n n
For picture pairs involving a rearrangement
transformation the only significant effect obtained was a
main effect of extent of transformation on recognition
memory. when target and distractor pair were consistent
children were less likely to correctly chose the target as
previously seen than when target and distractor were
inconsistent. The mean error rate on consistent pairs was
40.6%, twice the error rate of 20.3% on inconsistent pairs
(F(l,62) = 21.21; p < .001; see Appendix B) . As can be
seen in Figure l f this effect was similar for both
conventional and anomalous target pictures. Post hoc
Bonferroni t-tests indicated that these differences were
significant for conventional targets (t= 4.9938; p < .01)
and anomalous targets (t= 2.4826; p < .05). Thus,
children were more likely to recognize the target when the
rearrangement distractor was inconsistent with the target,
one being anomalous, the other conventional than when the
distractor and target were consistent, either both
anomalous or both conventional.
Substitution transformation
In contrast to the results for rearrangement test
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Fig. 1, Mean percent error for conventional and
anomalous targets paired with consistent and inconsis
tent rearrangement and substitution distractors.
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pairs, when the distractor consisted of a substitution
transformation, targets in inconsistent pairs were not
always better remembered than targets in consistent pairs.
For conventional targets, the mean error rate was greater
on consistent pairs (18.8%) than on inconsistent pairs
(8.6%). These results are comparable to those obtained
for rearrangement transformation. But for anomalous
targets the mean error rate was less on consistent pairs
(10.2%) than on inconsistent pairs (18.8%; see Figure 1)
.
This interaction of target with extent of transformation
was significant (F(1.62) = 7.86; p < .01; see Appendix C) .
Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated that for
conventional targets, the greater error rate on consistent
than on inconsistent pairs yielded a significant
difference (t= 2.42; p < .05). But for anomalous targets,
this difference in error rates was not significant (t=
1.66; p > .05)
.
An interesting question in these results is why,
contrary to expectation, children are making more errors
when an anomalous target is paired with a distractor
containing a conventional item (inconsistent pair) than
when both target and distractor contain an anomalous item
(consistent pair). One reason may be the children's
confusion between what they just saw and what they know to
be true, as reflected in their verbalizations. Two-thirds
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of the errors involving the anomalous inventory target -
conventional distractor pairs were accompanied by the S
saying something to the effect that, "A doesn't
belong in the ." while referring to the target, "So
I saw this one.", while referring to the distractor. it
seemed as though the children's recognition decisions were
swayed by what they knew to be thematically correct and
this overwhelmed any memory of the familiarized anomaly.
It is also interesting that this tendency to make
thematically correct inferences did not occur under the
rearrangement transformation. Perhaps children this age
are more likely to make interences about inventory than
arrangement of items in a scene.
Errors on Consistent inconsistent pairs
It has already been noted that for both conventional
and anomalous targets, children made more errors on
rearrangement than substitution test pairs. A more
stringent test of children's memory for these two kinds of
transformations was carried out by examining error rates
for targets in only conventional consistent pairs. This
comparison is a stringent test because when viewing a
conventional target and conventional distractor, memory
for details is necessary to correctly identify the target.
The child could not rely on general semantic knowledge
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om
about the theme of the picture to discriminate target fr
abstractor since both pictures were representative of the
theme portrayed. Mean error rates for pairs involving
substitution was 18.8%, significantly less than error
rates for the pairs involving rearrangement, 42.2% (t=
3.66; p < .05). This result is confirmation that children
had better memory for details about inventory than
arrangement of items.
Friedman (1979) found that adults made
significantly more recognition errors when substitution
involved expected items than when substitution involved
unexpected items. She considered this evidence for the
assimilation of the 2 pictures containing expected items
to the same schema. On the other hand, she hypothesized
that unexpected items were tagged, facilitating
recognition for those items. In the present study, young
children also tended to make more recognition errors when
substitution involved expected, conventional items than
when substitution involved unexpected anomalous items.
Error rates on these consistent conventional and anomalous
pairs were 18.8% and 10.2%, respectively. This
difference was not significant (t= 1.90; p > .05) but
the trend was in the expected direction.
Based on Friedman's ideas concerning substitution, it
was also predicted that recognition memory would be poorer
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for expected than unexpected arrangements of items.
However, this pattern was not found. Mean error rate for
conventional targets paired with conventional
rearrangement distractors was 42.2%, and that was similar
to the rate for anomalous targets paired with anomalous
rearrangement distractors (39.1%). The difference was not
significant (t= .51; p > .05).
In summary, the examination of error rates indicated
that 1) there was improvement in recognition memory with
increasing age, but no interaction of age with any of the
other variables; 2) error rates were comparable between
anomalous and conventional targets; 3) for both
conventional and anomalous targets, children made
significantly more errors on target-distractor pairs
involving rearrangement transformation than on pairs
involving substitution transformation; 4) for targets
paired with rearrangement distractors, and for
conventional targets paired with substitution distractors,
children made significantly more errors on consistent
target-distractor pairs than on inconsistent pairs; 5)
however, the children were more likely to make errors on
inconsistent than consistent pairs when anomalous
inventory targets were paired with substitution
distractors.
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Type of error
The data were further examined for frequency of the 3
types of judgement that were counted as errors. Children
either 1) chose the distractor picture as familiar, 2)
declared that target and distractor were the same and
refused to choose between them, or 3) noticed that target
and distractor were different but would not or could not
choose one as familiar. Of the total of 228 errors
committed by all children, 135 (59.2%) were "wrong"
answers, 57 (25%) were "same" answers, and 36 (15.8%) were
"unsure" answers. Errors were predominantly "wrong"
answers for 6 of the 8 kinds of target-distractor pairs
(see Table 3) . The percentage of errors that were "wrong"
answers for these 6 pairs ranged from 60.9% to 87.5%. The
two conditions in which "wrong" answers were not the
predominant basis for errors both involved consistent
rearrangement pairs. In these two conditions, the
percentage of errors that were "wrong" answers were only
33.3% and 48.0%, respectively. Moreover, these two
conditions accounted for 46 of the 57 "same" errors. All
together, rearrangement pairs accounted for 54 of the 57
"same" errors.
The predominance of "same" answers for rearrangement
pairs indicates that children had difficulty
discriminating between pictures which differed by the
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position of 2 items. This difficulty was enhanced when
the target and distractor were consistent in thematic
respresentativeness. Equally interesting was the fact that
of the small sum of 3 "same" answers given for target-
distractor pairs involving substitution of an item, all 3
were for pairs that were consistent in thematic
representativeness (row 2 of Table 3). Not once did a
child declare that a conventional picture and anomalous
picture were the same when the discrepancy involved one
conventional item versus an anomalous item. Apparently
this discrepancy was a salient one.
Of the 36 "unsure" errors, where children declined to
pick one picture from a pair as familiar, most occurred in
the consistent anomalous rearrangement pair (10) followed
by the consistent conventional rearrangement pair (6)
(see Table 3).. The number of "unsure" errors for the
other pairs ranged from 2 to 5. Although these errors
were more evenly distributed across testing conditions,
children were again more confused by the consistent
rearrangement pairs than any other pairs.
A Cochran Q test was used to test the relationship
between type of error and kind of pair. This relationship
was found to be significant (Q = 371.928; p < .001).
Thus, when making errors, children were more likely to
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detect the difference between target and distractor and
were less likely to be "unsure" when substitution was
involved. on the other hand, children were less able to
detect the difference between target and distractor and
were less confident of making a choice when rearrangement
was involved, especially when target and distractor were
consistent.
CHAPTER iv
DISCUSSION
The results of manipulation of the 3 variables,
target meaningfulness, type of transformation, and extent
of transformation will be discussed in terms of the role
schemata play in recognition memory. First, recognition
memory for anomalous and conventional target pictures was
similar, indicating that young children are able to
assimilate both types of pictures equally well into
schemata. Unlike anomalous pictures used in other studies
(eg., Mandler and Robinson, 1978) where scenes consisted
of unorganized arrays of objects, the anomalous pictures
in the present study consisted of 1 or 2 misplaced objects
or the presence of one inappropriate item. The children's
comparable memory for conventional and anomalous pictures
in this study indicated that the latter were not rendered
unorganized by these anomalies. Comments often
spontaneously made by the children also indicated that
they could identify the anomalous pictures as thematic
scenes. Some examples have already been mentioned in the
results section. Other instances included, eg., "The
grandma is reading the kid a story with a panda on the
wall. 11 ; "The sled is flying.".
A reason that children assimilated anomalous as well
47
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as conventional targets into schemata may have been
because they did not perceive the anomalies as such.
However, this explanation seems unlikely. For one thing,
children would spontaneously exclaim about the presence of
anomalies, eg., "You're not supposed to sit on a window!";
"Bananas don't go in the bathroom!". Another indication
that children could discriminate between conventional and
anomalous scenes was that pairing inconsistent pictures
resulted in better recognition memory for targets. This
facilitation suggests that children possess schemata which
contain limits for appropriate attributes of a pictorially
represented theme.
Secondly, there was a profound effect of type of
transformation, rearrangement versus substitution, on
recognition memory. Children exhibited greater
recognition accuracy for targets paired with substitution
than rearrangement distractors. These results are contrary
to those with older children (Mandler and Robinson, 1978;
Mandler and Stein, 1974) who attended equally well to
inventory and spatial information. However, these results
coincide with data obtained by Friedman (1979) who found
that adults were more likely to detect substitution than
rearrangement transformations. She concluded that an
inventory of objects was present in schematic
representations of pictures but that information about
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spatial location was either less likely to be stored or
more easily forgotten. This difference between memory for
inventory and arrangement information will be considered
at other points throughout the remainder of the
discussion.
Thirdly, the extent of the transformation between
target and distractor, consistent or inconsistent, had a
significant effect on recognition memory. Since the
results for rearrangement and substitution transformations
differed markedly, they will be discussed separately.
For both conventional and anomalous targets tested with
rearrangement transformations, more errors occurred on
consistent than on inconsistent pairs. Children were
required to remember specific details about the
arrangement of items in order to recognize the target in a
consistent pair. But when pictures were inconsistent,
children could rely on memory about whether or not the
familiarized picture contained an anomaly. Just recalling
that the picture was conventional or contained an anomaly
would discriminate the target from an inconsistent
distractor since one was conventional and the other was
anomalous
.
This facilitative effect of inconsistency on memory
can be considered a general form of "tagging": the picture
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is assimilated into a schema while the existence of, but
not details about, an anomaly is "stuck on". Although
general tagging may have occurred, this would not enhance
performance in an anomalous consistent pair since both
target and distractor were anomalous. Indeed, the
frequency of error on anomalous consistent pairs was no
less than that for conventional consistent pairs. a
specific tag, (Graesser, Gordon, and Sawyer, 1979) eg.,
the sun is on the ground; the pig is in the kitchen, would
need to be retrieved in order for recognition memory to be
facilitated for these pairs.
Just as assimilation of a conventional picture into a
schema results in loss of memory for details (Friedman,
1979)
,
perhaps without specific tagging of anomalous
arrangement, assimilation of an anomalous picture into a
schema also results in loss of memory for specific
details. Because anomalous pictures were assimilated as
well as conventional pictures, it makes sense that the
variables that affect, memory for anomalous and
conventional pictures are similar.
Like the rearrangement transformation, memory for
conventional targets paired with substitution distractors
was poorer for consistent pairs than inconsistent pairs.
These results provide support for Friedman's (1979)
proposition that assimilating 2 conventional scenes into
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the same schema results in confusion between the 2
pictures. But the opposite occurred for anomalous
inventory targets: recognition memory was poorer when the
distractor was inconsistent (conventional) than when it
was consistent (anomalous). when faced with a
conventional distractor children tended to "recognize"
that distractor as familiar more than the anomalous
distractor. Often, children who made this error commented,
eg., "A clock doesn't belong in the park... I saw the
tricycle." even though they were familiarized with the
"clock". In fact, according to the real world knowledge
that these young children were likely to have accumulated,
the conventional distractor may, indeed, have been more
familiar. In other words, these young children may have
been making inferences about inventory from the schemata
to which the pictures were assimilated, thus distorting
their memory of that information.
When shown an anomalous distractor, recognition
memory for an anomalous target was better than when the
distractor was conventional. For example, if the target
containing the clock was paired with the distractor
containing the telephone in the park, the children were
more likely to correctly select the target with the clock.
These results for substitution can be accounted for by
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Graesser, Gordon, and Sawyer's (1979) notion of specific
tagging. when shown 2 anomalous pictures, the children
were able to remember more than just the presence of an
anomaly. The tag was more specific, allowing the children
to remember the anomalous object and correctly identify
the target. Yet the tagging of anomalous items, though
more specific, is still precarious when the child is faced
with information conventional to the schema to which an
anomalous picture has been assimilated.
Recognition memory for anomalous targets paired with
anomalous distractors was also better than that for
conventional targets paired with conventional distractors
but only when substitution was involved. Again, memory
for anomalous targets was probably facilitated by the
children's ability to specifically tag anomalous inventory
during familiarization. Since this facilitation occurred
only with substitution and not rearrangement
transformation, these results are evidence that the
children were more proficient at tagging anomalous
inventory than anomalous arrangement information.
Children this age can notice whether an arrangement is
anomalous or not but cannot remember specific spatial
locations. On the other hand, children not only identify
anomalous inventory but also remember specifically what
the anomalous object was.
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Why do differences exist in children's memory for
inventory and arrangement information? As noted earlier,
Friedman (1979) concluded that there must be an object
inventory in schemata, but nothing analogous for
arrangement information. Schemata then, are defined more
by inventory than arrangement of items. if so, inventory
would be the more salient attribute of pictorial stimuli.
The types of errors made by the children also suggest
that inventory is more salient than arrangement. When 2
pictures were consistent in meaningfulness and differed by
arrangement of items, 44.3% of the recognition errors were
"same" errors, a result of children not discriminating
between target and distractor. On the other hand, not
once did a child fail to notice a difference between
consistent target and distractor involving substitution.
Further examination of the results for consistent
pairs reveals the ambiguity of arrangement relative to
inventory information. Goodman and Golding (1983) have
proposed that when information is ambiguous, what is
anomalous and what is conventional is not relevant or
determinable. The consequence of ambiguity of aa stimulus
is that recognition memory is similar for anomalous and
conventional information. In the present study, this
result was obtained for rearrangement transformation: in
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consistent pairs, memory for anomalous and conventional
targets was similar. On the other hand, if a stimulus is
unambiguous, the schema-conventional information does not
require active processing and attention is freed for the
processing of information anomalous to the schema. Thus,
more attention is given to anomalies, and the result is
better memory for anomalies than for conventional
information. In the present study, this result was
obtained for substitution transformation: in consistent
pairs, memory for anomalous targets was better than that
for conventional targets.
That inventory was less ambiguous than arrangement
information supports Friedman's (1979) proposition that
schemata contain more information about inventory than
spatial arrangement of objects. Both the present study
with preschoolers and Friedman's (1979) with adults found
that inventory was more salient. But Mandler and Robinson
(1978) found that for both elementary school children and
adults, inventory and arrangement were equally salient.
These contrasting results suggest a modification to
Friedman's proposition about the contents of schemata.
The pictures that Friedman used were very complex
and detailed, containing as many as 34 items in a picture.
The pictures that Mandler and Robinson (1978) used
contained only 6 nonoverlapping items and a perspective
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line. Similarly, in the present study, pictures consisted
of 4 or 5 items plus background. For adults and older
children, perhaps arrangement is remembered as well as
inventory in less complex, organized pictures; for young
children, inventory is far more salient than arrangement
of items in the same kind of picture. But if a picture
contains many items, the rearrangment of 2 items could be
less likely than substitution to be detected by an adult.
Thus, the greater salience of inventory over arrangement
that is obtained with preschoolers can appear in adults
who are overwhelmed with information.
For the young child, even an anomalous arrangement
can be undetected while inventory is noted. For example,
one child in the present study who was still particularly
interested in the task after completing the recognition
test, was asked which pictures were "silly". He
proclaimed that the anomalous park scene, (sun on ground,
bench in sky) was OK. After being asked to look again
carefully, he was questioned, "Does the sun belong on the
ground?" to which he replied, "Oh, is that on the
ground?. .. the sun doesn't go on the ground! That's a
silly picture.". In this picture the child failed to note
the anomalous arrangement. The child knew that the sun
belongs in the sky but when shown the picture of the sun
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on the ground, the inventory of the picture, not the
arrangement of those items, was used to judge the picture
conventional. However, this same child was able to
identify other seemingly more subtle anomalies such as the
big bird with a worm, not the squirrel, belongs on the
branch above the baby birdies in their nest. Arrangement
is not always ignored, but for the younger child spatial
arrangement is often not as salient as inventory.
In the present study, it was originally planned that
after the recognition test each child would see the target
pictures again and pick out the "silly" ones.
Unfortunately, the limited attention span of this age
group would not allow for this additional questioning.
Such information would have been valuable as to whether
there is a relationship between identification of an
anomaly and recognition memory under the various
conditions.
In summary, preschool children are able to assimilate
into memory and retrieve information about familiarized
conventional and anomalous scenes equally well. Overall,
when 2 pictures are consistent in representativeness to a
theme, children have more difficulty discriminating target
from distractor. When 2 pictures are inconsistent,
recognition performance is facilitated by memory for
general information about whether the target contains an
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anomaly or not. That they assimilate this general
information indicates that children this age possess
schemata which contain expectations about the inventory
and arrangement of items appropriate to the themes they
represent. it is these expectations contained in schemata
that Freidman (1979) and Brewer and Treyens (1981) use to
explain patterns of recognition memory for complex
pictures in adults. However, young children's attention
to inventory and arrangement information differs markedly.
Under every condition, memory for inventory was better
than memory for arrangement. This result indicates that
inventory of items is a more salient attribute of
pictorial stimuli than arrangement of those items. In
addition, differences in memory for conventional and
anomalous inventory and arrangement suggest that inventory
information is less ambiguous for the young child. This
in turn allows children to more proficiently tag specific
details about inventory than arrangement information. In
conclusion, knowledge about what items are appropriate to
familiar themes is a more integral part of schemata of the
young child than knowledge about appropriate spatial
relationships between those items.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Summary table for overall analysis of variance
Sum of degrees of MeanSource Sources freedom Square F
Age 1.27 1 1. 27 6.63
error 11. 84 b I
. 19
Block
.25 1
. 25 1.75
BlockxAge
. 02 1
.02
.11
error 8. 86 62
.14
Target
. 02 1
. 02
. 09
TargetxAgeO
. 00 1 0.00 0.00
error 10. 36 62 .17
Block
x Target .14 1 .14 .87
BxTxA
. 02 1
. 02 .10
error 9.97
• 10
Paira 2. 85 1 2.85 21.18
DairxAge . 19 1
. 19 1.42
error 8.34 62 .13
BlockxPair .04 1 . 04 .25
BxPxA .04 1 . 04 .25
error 8.55 62 . 14
Target x
pair 1.13 1 1.13 6 .06
TxPxA .19 1 .19 1.03
error 11. 55 62 19
BxTxP . 005 1 .004- .03
BxTxA . 10 1 . 10 . 71
error 8. 52 62 .14
Change 6.89 1 6.89 38. 95
Changexage . 02 1 .02 .09
error 10.97 62 .18
Block x
change 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
BxCxA . 02 1 .02 . 09
error 11.11 62 . 18
p
0125
.1908
.7420
. 7608
3583
7563
0000
2374
.6155
.6155
.0166
. 3158
. 8667
. 4025
. 0000
. 7673
1. 0000
. 7688
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Appendix A Continued
Sum o "F degrees or Mean
Source Sources freedom Square F pIT
Target x
Change 0 00 iX 0 . 00 0 . 00 1.0000TxCxA
. 14 i
.14 1.00
. 3216
error 8.73 62
.14
BxTxC
. 56 1
. 56 3.49
. 0666
BxTxCxA . 06 1
. Uo
. 5 359
error 10.00 62 .16
Pair x
change 2.44 1 Z • H: *4 in i £1U . ID n n o o
. UUzz
PxCxA .04 1 .04 .15
. 7034
error 14.90 62 .24
BxPxC
. 004 1
• \J \J T
. o o / z
BxPxCxA .04 1 .04 .25 .6162
error 8. 59 62 .14
TxPxC .19 1 .19 1. 32 .2554
TxPxCxA . 19 1 .19 1. 32 .2551
error 8. 99 62 . 15
BxTxPxC .10 1 .10 .67 .4158
BxTxPxCxA . 004 1 . 005 .03 .8704
error 9. 02 62 .15
aPair = extent of transformation between target and distrac-
tor
Change = type of transformation exhibited in distractor
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Appendix C
Summary Table of Anova Involving Substitution
Source
Age
Error
Block
Block x Age
Error
Target
Target x Age
Error
Block x
Target
Block x
Target x Age
Error
Pair
Pair x age
Error
Block x Pair
Block x Pair
x Age
Error
Target x Pair
Target x Pair x
Error
Block x Target
x Pair
Block x Target
x Pair x Age
Error
Sum of Degrees of Me an x a x x
Squares Freedom San ^ tp £ PrnK
. 50 1
.50 4 .20 .0446
7 . 38 62 12
.13 1 .13 1.05 . 3093
0.00 1 0 . 00 0.00 1. 0000
7.38 62
. 12
.01 1 .01 .08 .7758
.07 1
. 07 . 74 3942
5.92 62
. 10
.07 1 .07 .46 . 4989
.01 1 .01
. 05 8214
9. 42 62 .15
. 01 1 0] 8040
. 20 1 20• Cm \J 2174
7. 80 62
. 13
.01 1 .01 . 08 .7845
. 07 1 . 07 .68 .4131
6 .42 62 .10
1. 13 1 1.13 7. 86 .0067
je 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1. 0000
8. 88 62 . 14
.03 1 .03 .30 .5852
. 03 1 .03 .30 .5852
6.44 62 .10

